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Abstract
Threshold secret sharing based on the Chinese remainder theorem has been considered by Mignotte [23]
and Asmuth and Bloom [1]. In this paper we demonstrate that the Chinese remainder theorem can be used
for realizing more general access structures, as the compartmented or the weighted threshold ones. We also
prove that there exist some non-weighted threshold access structures whose realizations require the general
variant of the Chinese remainder theorem, i.e., the variant in which the modules are not necessarily pairwise
coprime.
As an application of the proposed secret sharing schemes, we present a multi-authority e-voting schemes in
which, as a novelty, the tallying authorities may have non-equal weights.
Keywords: secret sharing, Chinese remainder theorem, e-voting
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
A secret sharing scheme starts with a secret and then derives from it certain shares
(or shadows) which are distributed to users. The secret may be recovered only by
certain groups which belong to a predetermined access structure. In the ﬁrst secret
sharing schemes only the number of shares was important for recovering the secret.
Such schemes have been referred to as threshold secret sharing schemes. We mention
here Shamir’s scheme [29] based on polynomial interpolation, Blakley’s geometric
scheme [5], Mignotte’s scheme [23] and Asmuth-Bloom scheme [1], both based on
the Chinese remainder theorem. Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki [19], Benaloh and Leichter
[4] have proposed constructions for more general secret sharing schemes.
In this paper we prove that the Chinese remainder theorem can be used for
realizing more general access structures. We consider ﬁrst the compartmented secret
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sharing schemes, in which the set of users is partitioned into compartments and
the secret can be recovered if and only if the number of participants from any
compartment is greater than or equal to a ﬁxed compartment threshold and the
total number of participants is greater than or equal to a global threshold. We
extend Brickell’s construction [6] to the case that the global threshold is strictly
greater than the sum of the compartment thresholds and we indicate how to use
the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem in
order to decrease the size of shares.
We also extend the threshold Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom schemes in order
to address more general access structures. We present how to realize any weighted
threshold access structure (in which some positive weight is associated to each user
and the secret can be reconstructed if and only if the sum of the weights of the
participants is greater than or equal to a ﬁxed threshold) but we prove that our
extensions are also suitable for some non-weighted threshold access structures.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of this section is dedicated to some
preliminaries on number theory, focusing on the Chinese remainder theorem. After a
short introduction to secret sharing, we survey the threshold secret sharing schemes
based on the Chinese remainder theorem in Section 2. In Section 3 we extend
the Brickell’s construction for compartmented secret sharing to the case that the
global threshold is strictly greater than the sum of the compartment thresholds and
we indicate how to use the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese
remainder theorem in order to decrease the size of shares. In Section 4 we extend the
threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese remainder theorem to more
general access structures and discuss the homomorphic properties of the resulted
schemes. In Section 5 we describe a multi-authority e-voting scheme based on
the proposed secret sharing schemes. Our conclusions and some interesting future
research directions are presented in the last section.
In the rest of this section we present some basic facts and notations from number
theory. For more details, the reader is referred to [8].
Let a,m ∈ Z, m = 0. The quotient of the integer division of a by m will be
denoted by a div m and the remainder will be denoted by a mod m. Let a, b,m ∈ Z.
We say that a and b are congruent modulo m, and we use the notation a ≡ b mod m,
if m|(a − b). In case m = 0, a ≡ b mod m is equivalent with a mod m = b mod m.
The set {0, 1, . . . ,m− 1} will be denoted by Zm, for any integer m ≥ 1.
Let a1, . . . , an ∈ Z, a
2
1 + · · · + a
2
n = 0. The greatest common divisor (gcd)
of a1, . . . , an will be denoted by (a1, . . . , an). It is well-known that there exist
α1, . . . , αn ∈ Z that satisfy α1a1 + · · ·+ αnan = (a1, . . . , an) (the linear form of the
gcd).
Let a1, . . . , an ∈ Z such that a1 · · · an = 0. The least common multiple (lcm) of
a1, . . . , an will be denoted by [a1, . . . , an].
The Chinese remainder theorem has many applications in computer science (see
[10] for a survey on this topic). We only mention its applications to the RSA
decryption algorithm as proposed by Quisquater and Couvreur [27], the discrete
logarithm algorithm as proposed by Pohlig and Hellman [26], and the algorithm
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for recovering the secret in Mignotte’s threshold secret sharing scheme [23] or in
Asmuth-Bloom threshold secret sharing scheme [1].
Several versions of the Chinese remainder theorem have been proposed. The
next one is called the general Chinese remainder theorem ([24]):
Theorem 1.1 Let k ≥ 2, p1, . . . , pk ≥ 2, and b1, . . . , bk ∈ Z. The system of equa-
tions ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ b1 mod p1
...
x ≡ bk mod pk
has solutions in Z if and only if bi ≡ bj mod (pi, pj), for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Moreover,
if the above system of equations has solutions in Z, then it has a unique solution in
Z[p1,...,pk].
Ore has proven that this solution can be obtained as
k∑
i=1
γiδibi mod [p1, . . . , pk],
where δi =
[p1,...,pk]
pi
, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and γ1, . . . , γk are arbitrary integers such that
γ1δ1 + · · ·+ γkδk = 1 (remark that (δ1, . . . , δk) = 1).
When (pi, pj) = 1, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, one gets the standard version of the
Chinese remainder theorem. Garner [13] has found an eﬃcient algorithm for this
case and Fraenkel [12] has extended it to the general case.
2 Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes Based on the Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem
We present ﬁrst some basic facts about secret sharing schemes. The reader is
referred to [31] for a survey on this topic. Suppose we have n users labeled with the
numbers 1, . . . , n and consider a set of groups 2 A ⊆ P({1, 2, . . . , n}). Informally,
an A-secret sharing scheme is a method of generating (S, (I1, . . . , In)) such that
• (correctness) for any A ∈ A, the problem of ﬁnding the element S, given the set
{Ii | i ∈ A}, is “easy”;
• (security) for any A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) \A, the problem of ﬁnding the element S,
given the set {Ii | i ∈ A}, is intractable.
The set A will be referred to as the authorized access structure or simply as the
access structure, S will be referred to as the secret and I1, . . . , In will be referred to
as the shares (or the shadows) of S. The elements of the set A will be referred to
as the authorized groups.
2 P({1, 2, . . . , n}) denotes the set of all subsets of the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
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In a perfect secret sharing scheme, the shares of any unauthorized group give
no information (in information-theoretic sense) about the secret. Karnin, Greene,
and Hellman [20] have proven, using the concept of entropy, that in any perfect
threshold secret sharing scheme, the shares must be at least as long as the secret
and, later on, Capocelli, De Santis, Gargano, and Vaccaro [7] have extended this
result to the case of any perfect secret sharing scheme. In an ideal secret sharing
scheme, the shares are as long as the secret.
A natural condition is that an access structure A be monotone ([4]), i.e.,
(∀B ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}))((∃A ∈ A)(A ⊆ B)⇒ B ∈ A).
Any monotone access structure A is well speciﬁed by the set of the minimal
authorized groups, i.e., the set Amin = {A ∈ A|(∀B ∈ A \ {A})(¬B ⊆ A)}. Also,
the unauthorized access structure A, A = P({1, 2, . . . , n}) \ A, is well speciﬁed by
the set of the maximal unauthorized groups, i.e., the set Amax = {A ∈ A|(∀B ∈
A \ {A})(¬A ⊆ B)}.
In the ﬁrst secret sharing schemes only the number of the participants in the
reconstruction phase was important for recovering the secret. Such schemes have
been referred to as threshold secret sharing schemes.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let n ≥ 2, 2 ≤ k ≤ n. The access structure
A = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| ≥ k}
will be referred to as the (k, n)-threshold access structure.
In this case we also obtain that Amin = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k},
A = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| ≤ k − 1}, and Amax = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) |
|A| = k− 1}. Any A-secret sharing scheme will be referred to as an (k, n)-threshold
secret sharing scheme.
We brieﬂy discuss next the most important threshold secret sharing schemes
based on the Chinese remainder theorem.
2.1 Mignotte’s Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Mignotte’s threshold secret sharing scheme [23] uses some special sequences of in-
tegers, referred to as the Mignotte sequences.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let n be a positive integer, n ≥ 2, and 2 ≤ k ≤ n. An (k, n)-
Mignotte sequence is a sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers p1 < p2 <
· · · < pn such that
k−2∏
i=0
pn−i <
k∏
i=1
pi.
The above inequality is equivalent with
max1≤i1<···<ik−1≤n(pi1 · · · pik−1) < min1≤i1<···<ik≤n(pi1 · · · pik).
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Given a publicly known (k, n)-Mignotte sequence, the scheme works as follows:
• The secret S is chosen as a random integer such that β < S < α, where α =∏k
i=1 pi and β =
∏k−2
i=0 pn−i;
• The shares Ii are chosen as Ii = S mod pi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• Given k distinct shares Ii1 , . . . , Iik , the secret S is recovered, using the stan-
dard variant of the Chinese remainder theorem, as the unique solution modulo
pi1 · · · pik of the system
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ Ii1 mod pi1
...
x ≡ Iik mod pik
.
Indeed, the secret S is an integer solution of the above system by the choice
of the shadows and, moreover, S lies in Zpi1 ···pik because S < α. On the other
hand, having only k − 1 distinct shares Ii1, . . . , Iik−1 , we obtain only that S ≡
x0 mod pi1 · · · pik−1 , where x0 is the unique solution modulo pi1 · · · pik−1 of the
resulted system (in this case, S > β ≥ pi1 · · · pik−1 > x0). Therefore, in order to
assure a reasonable level of security, (k, n)-Mignotte sequences with a large factor
α−β
β
must be chosen (a method of generating such sequences is presented in [21,
page 9]).
Obviously, Mignotte’s scheme is not perfect, but it can lead to small shares and,
thus, can be used in applications in which the compactness of the shares is the
deciding factor.
We have extended Mignotte’s scheme in [17], by introducing the generalized
threshold Mignotte sequences whose elements are not necessarily pairwise coprime.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let n be an integer, n ≥ 2, and 2 ≤ k ≤ n. A generalized (k, n)-
Mignotte sequence is a sequence p1, . . . , pn of positive integers such that
max1≤i1<···<ik−1≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik−1 ]) < min1≤i1<···<ik≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik ]).
It is easy to see that every (k, n)-Mignotte sequence is a generalized (k, n)-
Mignotte sequence. Moreover, if we multiply every element of a (generalized) (k, n)-
Mignotte sequence p1, . . . , pn by a ﬁxed element δ ∈ Z, (δ, p1 · · · pn) = 1, we also
obtain a generalized (k, n)-Mignotte sequence.
The extended Mignotte scheme works like Mignotte’s scheme, where α =
min1≤i1<···<ik≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik ]) and β = max1≤i1<···<ik−1≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik−1 ]). In this
case, the general variant of the Chinese remainder theorem must be used for recov-
ering the secret.
2.2 Asmuth-Bloom Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
This scheme, proposed by Asmuth and Bloom in [1], also uses some special sequences
of integers. More exactly, a sequence of pairwise coprime positive integers p0, p1 <
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· · · < pn is chosen such that
p0 ·
k−2∏
i=0
pn−i <
k∏
i=1
pi.
Given a publicly known Asmuth-Bloom sequence, the scheme works as follows:
• The secret S is chosen as a random element of the set Zp0;
• The shares Ii are chosen as Ii = (S + γ · p0) mod pi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where γ is
an arbitrary integer such that S + γ · p0 ∈ Zp1···pk ;
• Given k distinct shares Ii1 , . . . , Iik , the secret S can be reconstructed as S =
x0 mod p0, where x0 is obtained, using the standard variant of the Chinese re-
mainder theorem, as the unique solution modulo pi1 · · · pik of the system
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ Ii1 mod pi1
...
x ≡ Iik mod pik
.
Goldreich, Ron, and Sudan [15] have proposed choosing p0, p1, . . . , pn as prime
numbers of the same size. Quisquater, Preneel, and Vandewalle [28] have proven
that, by choosing p0, p1, . . . , pn as consecutive primes, the resulted schemes are
asymptotically perfect and asymptotically ideal (for technical details, the reader is
referred to [28]).
The sequences used in Asmuth-Bloom scheme can be also generalized by allowing
modules that are not necessarily pairwise coprime in an obvious manner. We can
use any sequence p0, p1, · · · , pn such that
p0 ·max1≤i1<···<ik−1≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik−1 ]) < min1≤i1<···<ik≤n([pi1 , . . . , pik ]).
It is easy to see that if we multiply the elements, excepting the ﬁrst one, of
a (generalized) Asmuth-Bloom sequence p0, p1, · · · , pn with a ﬁxed element δ ∈ Z,
(δ, p0 · · · pn) = 1, we also obtain a generalized Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
3 Compartmented Secret Sharing Based on the Chi-
nese Remainder Theorem
In case of compartmented secret sharing, the set of users is partitioned into com-
partments and the secret can be recovered only if the number of participants from
any compartment is greater than or equal to a ﬁxed compartment threshold, and
the total number of participants is greater than or equal to a global threshold. The
compartmented secret sharing has been discussed for the ﬁrst time by Simmons in
[30]. Simmons has presented the example of an oﬃcial action that requires that
at least two U.S. members and at least two U.S.S.R. members be simultaneously
present for its initiation.
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The compartmented access structures can be introduced as follows.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let C = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm} be a partition of C0 = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
consider a sequence K = (k0, k1, k2, . . . , km), where kj ≤ |Cj|, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ m,
and
∑m
j=1 kj ≤ k0. The (C,K)-compartmented access structure is given by
A = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) |(∀j = 0,m)(|A ∩ Cj| ≥ kj)}.
In this case, any A-secret sharing scheme will be referred to as a (C,K)-
compartmented secret sharing scheme. The sets C1, C2, . . . , Cm will be referred
to as the compartments of the scheme, the values k1, k2, . . . , km as the compartment
thresholds and k0 as the global threshold of the scheme.
An (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is nothing else than a (C,K)-
compartmented secret sharing scheme with C = {{1, 2, . . . , n}} (m = 1) and
K = (k, k).
Brickell [6] has proposed an elegant solution for the case k0 =
∑m
j=1 kj by ex-
pressing the secret S as a combination of some compartment secrets s1, . . . , sm
and using an (kj , |Cj |)-threshold secret sharing scheme for obtaining the shares
{Ii|i ∈ Cj} corresponding to the compartment secret sj, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
In the reconstruction phase, if the number of participants from the jth com-
partment is greater than or equal to kj , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, then all com-
partment secrets can be recovered and, thus, the secret S can be obtained (re-
mark that in this case the compartmented access structure can be simpliﬁed to
{A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | (∀j = 1,m)(|A ∩ Cj| ≥ kj)}).
Ghodosi, Pieprzyk, and Safavi-Naini proposed an eﬃcient scheme for the general
case in [14].
We extend Brickell’s construction to the case
∑m
j=1 kj < k0 as follows.
- The secret is chosen as S = s0 + s1 + · · · + sm, where s0, s1, . . . , sm are positive
integers;
- The shares are chosen as Ii = (gi, ci), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
· g1, . . . , gn are the shares corresponding to the secret s0 with respect to an ar-
bitrary (k0, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme - these elements will be referred
to as the global components of the shares;
· for every 1 ≤ j ≤ m, {ci|i ∈ Cj} are the shares corresponding to the secret sj
with respect to an arbitrary (kj , |Cj |)-threshold secret sharing scheme - these
elements will be referred to as the compartment components of the shares.
Remark 3.2 (Correctness)
Let A be an authorized access group. Thus, |A| ≥ k0 and, for all j = 1,m, |A∩Cj | ≥
kj . Having at least k0 of the shares g1, . . . , gn, the value s0 can be obtained. Then,
for any j = 1,m, having at least kj of the shares {ci|i ∈ Cj}, the value sj can be
obtained, and ﬁnally, the secret S can be reconstructed as S = s0 + s1 + · · · + sm.
Remark 3.3 (Security)
Let A be an unauthorized access group. There are two possibilities:
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- |A| < k0 - in this case, the value s0 can not be determined;
- There is an compartment j such that |A∩Cj | < kj - in this case the value sj can
not be determined.
In both cases, the secret S can not be reconstructed.
Using perfect threshold secret sharing schemes as building blocks can lead to
large shares. We propose using the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the
Chinese remainder theorem in order to decrease the size of shares, maintaining,
at the same time, a reasonable level of security. For simplicity, we shall use only
Mignotte’s scheme, but we have to mention that this technique can be also applied
using Asmuth-Bloom scheme.
For any 0 ≤ j ≤ m, we will generate and broadcast a generalized (kj , |Cj |)-
Mignotte sequence (pj,i|i ∈ Cj). Let βj = maxi1,...,ikj−1∈Cj ([pj,i1, . . . , pj,ikj−1 ]) and
αj = mini1,...,ikj∈Cj ([pj,i1, . . . , pj,ikj ]), for 0 ≤ j ≤ m. We may use a generalized
Mignotte sequence twice in case that kj = kl and |Cj | = |Cl|, for some 1 ≤ j < l ≤
m. The secret S is chosen as S =
∑m
j=0 sj, where βj < sj < αj . The components
of the shares will be chosen as
gi = s0 mod p0,i,
ci = sc(i) mod pc(i),i,
where c(i) is the unique element j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, such that i ∈ Cj , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Example 3.4 illustrates this scheme.
Example 3.4 (with artiﬁcially small parameters)
Let us consider n = 6, C = {{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}}, the compartment thresholds k1 = 2,
k2 = 2 and the global threshold k0 = 5. The sequence 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 is a
(5, 6)-Mignotte sequence, with α0 = 85085 and β0 = 46189, and the sequence 7,
11, 13 is a (2, 3)-Mignotte sequence with α1 = α2 = 77 and β1 = β2 = 13. We
choose s0 = 50000, s1 = 30, and s2 = 40. The secret is S = 50070 and the
corresponding shares are I1 = (0, 2), I2 = (6, 8), I3 = (5, 4), I4 = (2, 5), I5 = (3, 7),
and I6 = (11, 1).
Having the shares I1 = (0, 2), I2 = (6, 8), I4 = (2, 5), I5 = (3, 7), and I6 = (11, 1),
we solve the systems ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ 0 mod 5
x ≡ 6 mod 7
x ≡ 2 mod 13
x ≡ 3 mod 17
x ≡ 11 mod 19
,
⎧⎨
⎩
x ≡ 2 mod 7
x ≡ 8 mod 11
,
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⎧⎨
⎩
x ≡ 7 mod 11
x ≡ 1 mod 13
,
and obtain, respectively, s0 = 50000, s1 = 30, s2 = 40, and ﬁnally S = 50070.
Let us analyze the security of the scheme. Let B be an unauthorized group
and consider ΔB = {j ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m}| |A ∩ Cj| < kj}. The informations obtained
from the shares corresponding to B lead to a set of possible vectors (s0, s1, . . . , sm)
of cardinality at least
∏
j∈ΔB
αj−βj
βj
. The generalized Mignotte sequences can be
thus generated accordingly to the unauthorized access structure in order to obtain
a suitable security level.
Although the shares of our scheme have two components, by using Mignotte’s
scheme as a building block, the sizes of shares can be smaller than the size of the
secret. Further improvements can be obtained by choosing the Mignotte sequences
and the values s0, s1, . . . , sm such that the global components of some shares coincide
with the corresponding compartment ones, i.e., gi = ci, for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
In this case we can deﬁne the share Ii as Ii = gi = ci. For this, we can generate ﬁrst
s1, . . . , sm and c1, . . . , cn and determining s0 by solving the system of equations
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ c1 mod p0,1
...
x ≡ ck0 mod p0,k0
.
We will choose Ii = gi = ci, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k0, gi = s0 mod p0,i and Ii = (gi, ci), for
all k0+1 ≤ i ≤ n. Further improvements can be obtained in case that s0 mod p0,i =
sc(i) mod pc(i),i, for some k0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Example 3.5 illustrates the reduction of the shares.
Example 3.5 (with artiﬁcially small parameters)
Let us reconsider Example 3.4. We choose s1 = 30 and s2 = 40. We obtain c1 = 2,
c2 = 8, c3 = 4, c4 = 5, c5 = 7, and c6 = 1. The system
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x ≡ 2 mod 5
x ≡ 8 mod 7
x ≡ 4 mod 11
x ≡ 5 mod 13
x ≡ 7 mod 17
has the solution s0 = 32817. The secret will be S = 32887 and the shares I1 = 2,
I2 = 8, I3 = 4, I4 = 5, I5 = 7, and I6 = (4, 1).
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Thus, in case that k0 is close to n, real improvements related to the size of shares
can be made. However, every compression of a share, i.e., any equalization of form
gi = ci, can aﬀect the security with a factor of
αc(i)−βc(i)
βc(i)
. Thus, depending of the
intended application, a compromise between the size of the shares and the level of
security must be made.
4 More General Secret Sharing Based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem
In this section we extend the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chinese
remainder theorem in order to deal with more general access structures. For this,
we will generalize the threshold Mignotte and Asmuth-Bloom sequences in a natural
manner, the rest of these secret sharing schemes remaining unaﬀected.
We begin with extending Mignotte sequences.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let n be a positive integer, n ≥ 2 and A ⊆ P({1, 2, . . . , n}). An
A-Mignotte sequence is a sequence of positive integers p1, . . . , pn such that
β = maxB∈A([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈A([{pi|i ∈ A}]) = α.
The above property is equivalent with
maxB∈Amax([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈Amin([{pi|i ∈ A}]).
If A is speciﬁed by Amin = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k} then any A-Mignotte
sequence is a generalized threshold (k, n)-Mignotte sequence in sense of Deﬁnition
2.3. It is easy to see that if we multiply the elements of an A-Mignotte sequence
p1, · · · , pn with a ﬁxed element δ ∈ Z, (δ, p1 · · · pn) = 1, we also obtain an A-
Mignotte sequence.
We will describe next how to construct Mignotte sequences in case of the
weighted threshold access structures.
In a weighted threshold secret sharing scheme, a positive weight is associated to
each user and the secret can be reconstructed if and only if the sum of the weights
of all participants is greater than or equal to a ﬁxed threshold. Such schemes have
been considered for the ﬁrst time by Shamir [29]. Shamir has discussed the case of
sharing a secret between the executives of a company such that the secret can be
recovered by any three executives, or by any executive and any vice-president, or
by the president alone. The Shamir’s solution for this case is based on a threshold
secret sharing scheme with the threshold 3. Thus, the president receives three
shares, each vice-president receives two shares and, ﬁnally, every simple executive
receives a single share.
The weighted threshold access structures can be introduced as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let n ≥ 2, ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) a sequence of positive integers, and w
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a positive integer such that 2 ≤ w ≤
∑n
i=1 ωi. The access structure
A = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) |
∑
i∈A
ωi ≥ w}
will be referred to as the (ω,w, n)-weighted threshold access structure.
In this case, any A-secret sharing scheme will be referred to as an (ω,w, n)-
weighted threshold secret sharing scheme. The parameters ω1, . . . , ωn will be referred
to as the weights and w will be referred to as the threshold of the scheme.
An (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is nothing else than an (ω,w, n)-
weighted threshold secret sharing scheme with ω1 = · · · = ωn = 1 and w = k.
In case that A is the (ω,w, n)-weighted threshold access structure, an A-
Mignotte sequence will be referred to as an (ω,w, n)-Mignotte sequence. More
exactly, an (ω,w, n)-Mignotte sequence is a sequence of positive integers p1, . . . , pn
such that
maxB∈P({1,2,...,n})P
i∈B ωi≤w−1
([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈P({1,2,...,n})P
i∈A ωi≥w
([{pi|i ∈ A}]).
An (ω,w, n)-Mignotte sequence can be constructed as follows (see also [18]). Let
p′1, . . . , p
′
N be a generalized threshold (w,N)-Mignotte sequence, where N =
∑n
i=1 ωi
and deﬁne pi = [{p
′
j | j ∈ Pi}], for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where {P1, . . . , Pn} is an arbitrary
partition of the set {1, 2, . . . , N} such that |Pi| = ωi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to
prove that the sequence p1, . . . , pn is indeed an (ω,w, n)-Mignotte sequence.
Benaloh and Leichter have proven in [4] that there exist access structures that are
not weighted threshold. We present next their example that proves this statement.
Example 4.3 (Benaloh and Leichter [4])
Let n = 4 and Amin = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. Suppose that this access structure is a
weighted threshold access structure with the weights ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, and the thresh-
old w. So, ω1 + ω2 ≥ w and ω3 + ω4 ≥ w. If we sum these inequalities we obtain
ω1+ω2+ω3+ω4 ≥ 2w, and, thus, we obtain that 2·max(ω1, ω2)+2·max(ω3, ω4) ≥ 2w
which leads to max(ω1, ω2) +max(ω3, ω4) ≥ w. Thus, one of the sets {1, 3}, {1, 4},
{2, 3} or {2, 4} is an authorized access group!
We will present how to realize this access structure using the proposed extension
of Mignotte scheme. In fact, the main problem is to ﬁnd an A-Mignotte sequence.
More exactly, we are interested in ﬁnding a sequence of positive integers p1, p2, p3, p4
such that
max([p1, p3], [p1, p4], [p2, p3], [p2, p4]) < min([p1, p2], [p3, p4]).
It is interesting to remark that this access structure can not be realized using
sequences of pairwise coprime numbers. Indeed, there is no A-Mignotte sequence
with pairwise coprime elements, because, otherwise, the above inequality will lead
to p1p3 < p1p2 and p2p4 < p3p4 and, thus, to p3 < p2 and p2 < p3!
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If q1, q2, q3, q4 are pairwise coprime, then the sequence p1 = q1q2, p2 = q3q4, p3 =
q1q3, p4 = q2q4 is an A-Mignotte sequence. In this case, the general variant of the
Chinese remainder theorem must be used for recovering the secret.
Asmuth-Bloom sequences can be extended as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.4 Let n be a positive integer, n ≥ 2 and A ⊆ P({1, 2, . . . , n}). An
A-Asmuth-Bloom sequence is a sequence of positive integers p0, p1, . . . , pn such that
p0 ·maxB∈A([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈A([{pi|i ∈ A}]).
The above property is equivalent with
p0 ·maxB∈Amax([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈Amin([{pi|i ∈ A}]).
If A is speciﬁed by Amin = {A ∈ P({1, 2, . . . , n}) | |A| = k} then any A-Asmuth-
Bloom sequence is a generalized threshold (k, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence. It is easy
to see that if we multiply the elements, excepting the ﬁrst one, of an A-Asmuth-
Bloom sequence p0, p1, · · · , pn with a ﬁxed element δ ∈ Z, (δ, p0 · · · pn) = 1, we also
obtain an A-Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
We will describe next how to construct Asmuth-Bloom sequences in case of the
weighted threshold access structures. Let n ≥ 2, ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn) a sequence of
weights, and w a threshold. An (ω,w, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence is a sequence of
positive integers p0, p1, . . . , pn such that
p0 ·maxB∈P({1,2,...,n})P
i∈B ωi≤w−1
([{pi|i ∈ B}]) < minA∈P({1,2,...,n})P
i∈A ωi≥w
([{pi|i ∈ A}]).
An (ω,w, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence can be constructed as follows. Let
p′0, p
′
1, . . . , p
′
N be a generalized threshold (w,N)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence, where
N =
∑n
i=1 ωi and deﬁne p0 = p
′
0 and pi = [{p
′
j | j ∈ Pi}], for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
{P1, . . . , Pn} is an arbitrary partition of the set {1, 2, . . . , N} such that |Pi| = ωi,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is easy to prove that the sequence p0, p1, . . . , pn is indeed an
(ω,w, n)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
Example 4.5 illustrates this construction.
Example 4.5 (with artiﬁcially small parameters)
Consider n = 4, the weights ω1 = ω2 = 1, ω3 = ω4 = 2, and the threshold w = 3.
We obtain N = 6. The sequence 5, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37 is a (3, 6)-Asmuth-Bloom
sequence and, if we consider the partition {{6}, {5}, {1, 4}, {2, 3}} of the set
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, we obtain that the sequence 5, 37, 31, 17 · 29, 19 · 23 is an
((1, 1, 2, 2), 3, 4)-Asmuth-Bloom sequence.
The access structure given by Amin = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} can not be realized using
Asmuth-Bloom sequences of pairwise coprime numbers. Indeed, there is no A-
Asmuth-Bloom sequence with pairwise coprime elements, because, otherwise, the
condition p0 ·max([p1, p3], [p1, p4], [p2, p3], [p2, p4]) < min([p1, p2], [p3, p4]) will lead
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to p0p1p3 < p1p2 and p0p2p4 < p3p4 and, thus, to p0p3 < p2 (which implies p
2
0p3 <
p0p2), and p0p2 < p3, which will ﬁnally lead to p
2
0 < 1!
If q1, q2, q3, q4 are pairwise coprime, then the sequence p0, p1 = q1q2, p2 =
q3q4, p3 = q1q3, p4 = q2q4 is an A-Asmuth-Bloom sequence, for any p0 < min(q1, q2,
q3, q4). Indeed, in this case, min([p1, p2], [p3, p4]) = q1q2q3q4 and max([p1, p3],
[p1, p4], [p2, p3], [p2, p4]) =
q1q2q3q4
qi
, for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. In this case, the general
variant of the Chinese remainder theorem must be used for recovering the secret.
4.1 Secret Sharing Homomorphisms
Benaloh has introduced the notion of secret sharing homomorphisms in [2]. We
present here a slightly diﬀerent version of his deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Let S and S1, . . . ,Sn be the set of possible secrets and, respectively,
the set of possible shares corresponding to each user. Consider the binary operations
⊕ and ⊗1, . . . ,⊗n over these sets. We say that an A-secret sharing scheme is
(⊕,⊗1, . . . ,⊗n)−homomorphic if for any S1, S2 ∈ S with the corresponding shares
(I11 , . . . , I
1
n), and respectively, (I
2
1 , . . . , I
2
n), the shares of the secret S1⊕S2 are (I
1
1⊗1
I21 , . . . , I
1
n ⊗n I
2
n).
Intuitively, this means that the compositions of the shares are shares of the
composition of the secrets.
The extended Mignotte scheme has such properties. Let ⊗ be a binary operation
over Z, ⊗ ∈ {+,−, ·}, and let ⊗m denote the corresponding operation modulo m,
i.e., ⊗m is the binary operation over Zm given by a⊗m b = (a⊗ b) mod m, for any
a, b ∈ Zm. If p1, . . . , pn is an extended Mignotte sequence and ⊗ ∈ {+,−, ·}, then
the corresponding secret sharing scheme is (⊗,⊗p1 , . . . ,⊗pn)-partial homomorphic,
in sense that, if S1 and S2 are some secrets such that β < S1 ⊗ S2 < α, with
the corresponding shares (I11 , . . . , I
1
n), and respectively, (I
2
1 , . . . , I
2
n), then (I
1
1 ⊗p1
I21 , . . . , I
1
n ⊗pn I
2
n) are the shares corresponding
3 to the secret S1 ⊗ S2.
The extended Asmuth-Bloom scheme has homomorphic properties in case that
the extended Asmuth-Bloom sequence has the property p0|pi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In
this case, the secret can be expressed as
S = (
∑
i∈A γiδiIi mod [{pi|i ∈ A}]) mod p0
=
∑
i∈A γiδiIi mod p0,
for some authorized group A, where δi =
[{pi|i∈A}]
pi
, for all i ∈ A, and γi, for i ∈
A, are arbitrary integers such that
∑
i∈A γiδi = 1. Thus, any extended Asmuth-
Bloom scheme based on a sequence with such properties is (⊗p0,⊗p0, . . . ,⊗p0) -
homomorphic, where ⊗ ∈ {+,−}. Unfortunately, the property p0|pi also implies
3 This property follows directly from the properties of the congruences. More exactly, if S1 ≡ I1i mod pi
and S2 ≡ I2i mod pi then S1 ⊗ S2 ≡ I
1
i ⊗pi I
2
i mod pi.
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that
Ii mod p0 = ((S + γ · p0) mod pi) mod p0
= (S + γ · p0) mod p0
= S,
and, thus, the security of the scheme is entirely compromised. It will be interesting
to ﬁnd Asmuth-Bloom sequences which lead to homomorphic properties, without
aﬀecting the security of the scheme. One solution would be to ﬁndA-Asmuth-Bloom
sequences p0, p1, . . . , pn such that p0|[{pi|i ∈ A}], for all A ∈ Amin, but p0  |pi, for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
5 An E-voting Scheme
According to [32], “an electronic voting (e-voting) system is a voting system in which
the election data is recorded, stored and processed primarily as digital information”.
We present next the most important requirements for an e-voting scheme (the reader
is referred to [16] for more details):
• Correctness - according to this requirement, the announced tally is identical with
the real outcome of the election;
• Privacy - this requirement guarantees that no reasonable sized coalitions of voters
or authorities may link a voter’s identity to his vote;
• Robustness - according to this requirement, no reasonable sized coalitions of voters
or authorities may aﬀect the election;
• Veriﬁability - this requirement assures the existence of some mechanisms for au-
diting the election in order to verify if it has taken place properly.
We have to remark that these properties may contradict or interrelate one with
another. For example, veriﬁability implies the existence of some proofs for the
consistency of the votes but these may aﬀect privacy. On the other hand, veriﬁability
is a strong supporter both for the correctness and for the robustness of the scheme.
We focus only on the case of yes/no e-voting. We follow the approach of Benaloh
[2], [3] for designing a multi-authority e-voting scheme. The novelty of our scheme is
that the tallying authorities may have non-equal weights. The parties involved are
the voters V1, . . . , Vm, the tallying authorities A1, . . . , An and the central authority
A. We present next the steps of our e-voting scheme.
• Setup
· The central authority A decides on an authorized access structureA for the tally-
ing authorities and generates and broadcasts an A-Mignotte sequence p1, . . . , pn
with a large factor α−β
β
;
· The central authority A broadcasts the values vyes and vno, where vyes, vno ∈
{β + 1, . . . , α− 1} are assigned to the yes vote and to the no vote;
• Ballot Construction
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· For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the voter Vj chooses a vote mask
4 bj , 0 < bj < α− vj , for his
vote vj ∈ {vyes, vno} and forms the ballot Bj = vj + bj ;
· The voter Vj securely sends the sub-ballot Bj,i = Bj mod pi to the tallying
authority Ai, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• Ballot Tallying
· At the end of ballot construction period, the tallying authority Ai computes
the partial “masked” tally Ti =
∑m
j=1 Bj,i mod pi and securely sends it to the
central authority A, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
· The central authority A obtains the ﬁnal “masked” tally T =
∑m
j=1 Bj by solv-
ing, using the general variant of the Chinese remainder theorem, the system of
equations {
x ≡ Ti mod pi, i ∈ A
for some A ∈ A; for the correctness of this reasoning, any possible ﬁnal
“masked” tally T must satisfy T < α (the relation β < T holds by the choice
of the values vyes, vno and of the mask values). Indeed, in this case, by the fact
that the extended Mignotte secret sharing scheme is (+,+p1 , . . . ,+pn)-partial
homomorphic, the values T1, . . . , Tn are the shares of the element T . In order to
assure T < α, the central authority A may impose, for example, the condition
m · (max(vyes, vno) + max(b1, . . . , bm)) < α;
· At the previous step, the central authority A can also verify the consistency of
the values Ti, i ∈ A, by testing if Ti ≡ Ti′ mod (pi, pi′), for any i, i
′ ∈ A;
• Vote Casting
· At the end of ballot tallying period, the voter Vj securely sends bj to the central
authority A, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m;
• Vote Counting
· At the end of vote casting period, the central authority A computes the sum of
votes S =
∑m
j=1 vj as S = T −
∑m
j=1 bj ;
· The numbers of yes and no votes can be obtained as the solution of the equation
vyes ·x+vno ·y = S; if the values vyes and vno are chosen such that m ·vyes < vno,
then this solution can be determined as
number votes no = S div vno,
number votes yes = (S mod vno) div vyes.
• The central authority broadcasts number votes yes, number votes no.
Our e-voting scheme has the following properties:
• Privacy - in order to link a voter’s identity (Vj) to his vote (vj), at least an au-
thorized group of tallying authorities and the central authority must collaborate.
4 The purpose of the masks is to hide any information about the voters’ choices. Moreover, the ballot
construction and ballot tallying can be performed in advance.
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Indeed, the ballot Bj may be reconstructed only by an authorized group of tal-
lying authorities and the mask bj is known only by the central authority. Thus,
our scheme assures privacy against any coalition formed by a group B ∈ A of
tallying authorities and the central authority A;
• Veriﬁability - some veriﬁcations are made in the ballot tallying phase but some
proofs have to be added at the voters’ level. This includes the proof that a voter
really chooses a vote in {vyes, vno} and the proof that the sub-ballots are properly
derived. For the second part, veriﬁable secret sharing (see [11], [25]) may be used.
A non-interactive modular veriﬁable secret sharing scheme was proposed in [22]
and we may use it for our case;
• Robustness - assuming that the voters’ actions are performed honestly (or using
veriﬁable secret sharing for detecting frauds), the election carries on correctly if
at least a group A ∈ A of tallying authorities and the central authority A act
honestly.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have demonstrated that the Chinese remainder theorem can be used for realizing
more general access structures than the threshold ones.
We have ﬁrst extended Brickell’s construction for compartmented secret sharing
to the case that the global threshold is strictly greater than the sum of the com-
partment thresholds and we have proposed using threshold secret sharing schemes
based on the Chinese remainder theorem as building blocks in order to decrease the
size of shares, maintaining, in the same time, a reasonable level of security.
We have then extended the threshold secret sharing schemes based on the Chi-
nese remainder theorem in order to deal with more general access structures. We
have presented how to realize any weighted threshold access structure but we have
also proven that our extensions are suitable for realizing some non-weighted thresh-
old access structures. In our future work, we will investigate what other classes
of access structures can be realized using our schemes and we will also study the
related problem of generating Mignotte or Asmuth-Bloom sequences. It is inter-
esting to remark that some access structures can not be realized using sequences
of pairwise coprime numbers and, thus, the general variant of the Chinese remain-
der theorem must be used for recovering the secret. The access structure given by
Amin = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} is such an example (see Section 4). It will be interesting to
ﬁnd other access structures with the same property or even ﬁnd a general criterion
for deciding if a certain access structure may be realized using the standard variant
of the Chinese remainder theorem.
We have presented a multi-authority e-voting scheme based on the proposed
secret sharing schemes, in which, as a novelty, the tallying authorities may have
non-equal weights. The resulted e-voting scheme has some important properties
as privacy and robustness. Some veriﬁability mechanisms are present in the ballot
tallying phase but in our future work we will try to add proofs of consistency at
voters’ level and at the central authority level (following, for example, the approach
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described in [9]).
Threshold cryptography in which the implicated parties may have non-equal
weights is another promising future research direction and we think that our secret
sharing schemes can be used in this sense.
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